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JURY COMPROMISE
IN PENNSYLVANIA NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
While crossing the street on a snowy evening, Peter Partygoer is hit
and injured by an automobile driven by Stirling Speedster. Peter sues
Stirling in a Pennsylvania court of common pleas. The plaintiff estab-
lishes that the defendant was speeding and that his negligence seems to be
causative of the accident. Peter goes on to prove certain damages which
are undisputed by the defendant: $1,000 for medical expenses and $500
for loss of earnings. In addition, $2,000 is sought for pain and suffering.
Stirling's defense is based solely upon the allegation that the plaintiff
darted into the street without looking and so contributed to the accident.
The defendant is successful in making a fairly strong argument for con-
tributory negligence. On this basis the case is properly sent to the jury
with the standard charge on the law of negligence: that causative fault is
required to hold the defendant liable, and that plaintiff's contributory
negligence, if found, will totally bar his recovery. The jury returns a
verdict for the plaintiff but awards him only $1,200, well below the proven
special damages. Something is clearly amiss, but the trouble cannot be
isolated with certainty.
The simplest explanation for the jury's anomalous result is clerical
error-an inadvertent mistake in recording the figures. This type of error
is, however, improbable, and, if counsel are careful in polling the jury,
nearly impossible. A less appealing explanation is the chance that the
jury was influenced by prejudice against one of the parties and resolved
this extralegal feeling on a financial basis.' Neither of these factors is in
any real sense a compromise of legal issues; they are total failures of the
jury to perform its function because of either mistake or passion. Thus,
the impetus of error in the $1,200 verdict is not necessarily compromise.
In spite of this uncertainty, the Pennsylvania courts have displayed a
willingness to treat verdicts such as that returned in Peter's case as com-
promises. 2 Even though most of the apparent "compromise" cases may
I Although in passing on the adequacy of a verdict the element of prejudice is a
ground for reversal, the burden placed on one who would overturn the result is
heavy. See note 17 infra and accompanying text. It is doubtful that the amount
of the verdict alone would be sufficient in Peter's case to meet the test which requires
"'a clear conviction, compelled by the evidence, that the jury must have been influenced
by partiality, passion or prejudice ..... ".Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350
Pa. 184, 187, 38 A.2d 44, 45 (1944).
2 See, e.g., Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). In reversing
the order of the trial court granting a new trial, the superior court recently stated:
"We believe that this was a compromise verdict which arose out of the evidence
concerning damages and negligence, and that the refusal of the court below to accept
the jury's judgment in the matter was error." Hilscher v. Ickinger, 166 A.2d 678,
682 (Pa. Super. 1960).
(732)
JURY COMPROMISE
be actual compromises on liability, a court can never be sure, in any spe-
cific case, that the apparent is the actual. A verdict which seems to reflect
some doubt or disagreement as to the defendant's negligence may in fact
be the result of complete agreement on two matters: negligence and an
intense dislike of the plaintiff's manner.
Actual compromise may take various forms.3 While entertaining
doubts as to the defendant's liability, the jury may wish, out of sympathy,
to give the plaintiff something-possibly with an awareness that some
unknown insurance company will suffer the loss. Or it may question
the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence.4 Or the jury may
be uncertain, despite uncontradicted testimony, as to the plaintiff's loss
and compromise the amount awarded on the basis of conjecture. But
whatever factors are behind the result, some form of jury lawlessness is
involved in the verdict.
Before examining the Pennsylvania treatment of compromise cases,
it will be helpful to distinguish several other types of uncustomary verdicts
which are not analytically useful in solving the compromise problem.5 The
common features of these verdicts are two: first, the deviations relate to
the amount of the verdict; and second, the deviations may proceed from
identical jury motivation. Should the jury return a verdict of one dollar,
the question is whether the nominal verdict is effectively a judgment for
the defendant or a grossly incorrect verdict on the amount of the damages.
It is patent, if there be some proven damages, that the jury has made a
mistake; the problem goes to the method of judicial correction. Shall a
new trial be granted or must the judgment be reversed and rendered for
the defendant? Or the jury might return an amount of $1,500-consti-
tuting the exact amount of, or an amount only slightly higher than, the
out-of-pocket expenses of the plaintiff. Now there is an issue of sub-
stantiality or adequacy of damages centered around the disregard of the
more speculative pain and suffering.6 The error of the jury does not
appear on the face of the verdict. Thus the reviewing court is forced to
look into the factual record for a plausible explanation and, in the absence
of a satisfactory rationale, to return the case for retrial. Apparently quite
3 "The compromise may arise out of damages or negligence or the balance of
evidence concerning either or both .... " Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 115, 152
A.2d 238, 240 (1959).
4 Compromise may also be present where plaintiff claims that, despite his con-
tributory negligence, defendant was wantonly negligent. The Pennsylvania rule in
such a case is that contributory negligence is not a bar. Kasanovich v. George, 348
Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943). This type of case raises the further question of the
seriousness of plaintiff's contributory conduct; if it rises to the level of contributory
recklessness, he will be barred in spite of defendant's reckless action. Elliott v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 643, 53 A.2d 81 (1947). Obviously, compromise
may occur with regard to any of these legal questions.
5For an excellent review of many of the problems involved in jury verdicts,
see Wilson, The Motion for New Trial Based on Inadequacy of Damages Awarded,
39 NEB. L. Rxv. 694 (1960).6 This is true unless the damages for pain and suffering were proven with a
certainty approaching that of proof of the special damages; in such cases the problems
are essentially those of compromise.
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often in adequacy cases-and with much less regularity in instances of the
nominal verdict--compromise is at work.7  However, because of the con-
text of these two types of cases, the issue is not squarely raised and does
not lend itself to detachment from the previously mentioned questions.
But in Peter's verdict of $1,200, the element of compromise is unavoid-
ably presented to the court on appeal, provided, of course, that the court
is willing to assume that neither simple mistake nor prejudice was the
motivating factor.
Since in Pennsylvania the problems created by compromise verdicts
can be seen most clearly in connection with the question of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence, the analysis of this Note will be limited to those
cases. However, the implications and effects of jury lawlessness with
regard to the judicial process are not peculiar to cases in this category-
such difficulties are produced by all forms of compromise.
THE DOUBLE STANDARD
Faced with verdicts viewed as reflecting compromise, the reviewing
court must juggle two statements of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
which, when taken together, raise serious problems of both a practical and
a theoretical nature: 8
(1) The rule is that any degree of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, contributing to the injury, destroys his right to recover
. ,* *[The rule] is safe and easy of application by the jury. It
is the kind of action, not the quantity, on the part of the plaintiff,
which prevents the law from measuring between plaintiff and de-
fendant their respective degrees of negligence when the former comes
into a court of justice.9
(2) Where the evidence of negligence or contributory negligence,
or both, is conflicting or not free from doubt, a trial judge has the
power to uphold the time-honored right of a jury to render a com-
promise verdict and to sustain a verdict which is substantial-a
capricious verdict or one against the weight of the evidence or against
the law, can and should always be corrected by the Court.'0
7 Cf. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award,
19 OHio ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
S Undoubtedly, the present problem was generated by the exigencies of reality
impinging on theory. The concern of this Note will be with the practical problems
flowing from the theoretical incompatability presented by the existence of the two
rules, and with possible means of resolving the conflict.
9 Oil City Fuel Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449, 463, 15 Atl. 865, 867 (1888);
accord, Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 202, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943) ; see Monon-
gahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9, 2 Atl. 87 (1885).
10 Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 235, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955) ; accord, Elza
v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112, 115, 152 A.2d 238, 240 (1959) ("compromise verdicts are
both expected and allowed"); Hilscher v. Ickinger, 166 A.2d 678, 680 (Pa. Super.
1960) ; cf. Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 38 A.2d 14 (1944) ; Ewing v.
Marsh, 174 Pa. Super. 589, 101 A.2d 391 (1954); see Salemmo v. Dolan, 192 Pa.
Super. 51, 159 A.2d 253 (1960).
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Seemingly contradictory rules such as these do not always present a seri-
ous dilemma. The rules may, in fact, not be conflicting, or they may
represent the abandonment of an established rule for a different one-a
process clearly within the function of common-law courts.1 1 However,
neither answer provides an adequate explanation of the compromise cases.
At common law, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
is an absolute bar to recovery.12 As indicated in the first quotation, a
quantitative measurement is unnecessary.' 3 Thus, if a plaintiff is guilty of
any negligence, his damages are entirely denied; conversely, if he does
recover, there is necessarily a finding that he is entirely free from con-
tributory negligence and so will be allowed all proven damages.14 Hence,
under the common-law rule it is theoretically impossible for the plaintiff
to recover and then have the measure of damages reduced because of his
own negligence. The traditional view compels the jury to resolve the
issue of contributory negligence, regardless of whether "the evidence . . .
is conflicting or not free from doubt." Any doubt or conflict has to be
resolved before allowing recovery and does not carry over to the damage
issue. It is clear that the two rules are in conflict. Unfortunately, the
conflict has not yet been obviated by judicial or legislative abandonment
of one or the other; Pennsylvania has neither openly adopted comparative
negligence nor disavowed the traditional bar.15 Thus, the "time-honored
right of a jury to render a compromise verdict" in Pennsylvania merits
close scrutiny.
UPHOLDING JURY COMPROMISE
Prior to reaching the issue of compromise, the court must appraise
the verdict to ascertain whether it meets the test of substantiality and
adequacy:'
11 See, e.g., Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E2d 691 (1951) (complaint
alleging prenatal injuries states a cause of action; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220,
133 N.E. 567 (1921), overruled).
1 E.g., FLEMING, TORTS 244 (1957); JAMEs, ToRTs 152-53 (1959); MoRRIs,
TORTS 215 (1953).
13 There is an exception to this rule where defendant's negligence is said to rise
to a level of a wanton breach of duty. Such cases are not free of the problems pre-
sented by compromise verdicts, see note 4 supra. See generally Mole & Wilson, A
Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 334-35 (1932).
14 Within this simple dichotomy there is a type of situation which is not easily
classified into either mutually exclusive category-viz., when the plaintiff is negligent
and this negligence, though not contributing to his accident, does, in fact increase
his injury. Although this theoretical hybrid is important, it is more relevant in ex-
plaining a particular factual result and will be treated in that context See notes
29-33 infra and accompanying text.
15 The court reiterated the traditional bar theory in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa.
227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). However, it also spoke of the "time-honored right!' of
compromise. Id. at 235, 114 A2d at 154. For cases stating the common-law rule,
see Pascarella v. Pittsburgh Ry., 389 Pa. 8, 131 A.2d 445 (1957); Kasanovich v.
George, 343 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943); Weir v. Haverford Elec. Light Co., 221
Pa. 611, 70 At. 874 (1908); Oil City Fuel Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449, 15
AtI. 865 (1888) ; Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9, 2 AtI. 87 (1885).
16 If the verdict is held to be inadequate, there will be a new trial and the issue
of compromise relates only to the jury's motivation in returning an erroneous verdict
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No mere difference of opinion, nothing short of a clear con-
viction, compelled by the evidence, that the jury must have been in-
fluenced by partiality, passion or prejudice or by some misconception
of the law or the evidence, will justify an appellate court in declaring
that the trial court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in refusing
a new trial for inadequacy of damages where neither the evidence
in the particular case nor the law applicable thereto furnished any
definite standard by which they might be measured, and the jury
had no other guide in arriving at the amount to be awarded but pure
conjecture.
17
This rule, if literally applied, would be sufficient to strike down com-
promise verdicts, for the jury has indeed misconceived the law in believ-
ing that contributory negligence could be utilized to reduce plaintiff's re-
covery; even more certainly the rule would censure a verdict resulting
from clerical error or prejudice. Nevertheless, this is done only where
the defendant is clearly liable and where the court finds the conflicting
evidence of contributory negligence extremely weak or nonexistent. 8 Such
an interpretation allows most compromise verdicts to pass the sufficiency
test with little difficulty. However, this does not prevent the court from
considering, apart from substantiality, a further question: can the verdict,
being a compromise, stand? 19
Many of the various rationales for sustaining court-recognized com-
promise verdicts do not attempt to fit the result within the law as charged
to the jury. Without doubt the simplest solution for the problem posed
by the existence of compromises is to ignore the common-law rule and treat
them as a long-recognized function of juries.20
Unfortunately, the label "time-honored"-if historical precedents are
existent 2 1 -is not up to the task of showing why the jury has a "right"
However, the courts' test for substantiality is so broad that it could, if the court
desired, include compromise verdicts. On the other hand, if the court does not find
a verdict inadequate under this test, the very broad language of the rule becomes a
barrier to a subsequent holding of compromise. Cf. Salemmo v. Dolan, 192 Pa. Super.
51, 159 A.2d 253 (1960).
17 Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 187, 38 A.2d 44, 45 (1944). (Em-
phasis added.) Cf. Salemmo v. Dolan, supra note 16, where the substantiality test
goes only to adequacy of amount.
IS See, e.g., Coward v. Ruckert, 381 Pa. 388, 113 A.2d 287 (1958); Fitzgerald
v. Pennsylvania Transp. Co., 353 Pa. 43, 44 A.2d 288 (1945). These cases indicate
that only a few of the compromise cases are in fact reversed by application of the
substantiality rule.
19 Aside from the broad formulation of the court, the questions can best be
dealt with separately; although both spring from juries' actions, one is based on
factual value judgments, while the argument in compromise cases is basically predi-
cated on disobedience of instructions, regardless of the results. See Carpenelli v.
Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 38 A.2d 44 (1944).
20 This is precisely what Mr. Justice Bell did when he spoke of the "time-honored
right" in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 235, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
2 1 Unfortunately there were, in the opinion, no cases cited to support this propo-
sition. Earlier Pennsylvania cases hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Weir v. Haverford
[Vo1.109:732
JURY COMPROMISE
to disregard instructions. It merely notes and accepts what in fact has
already happened. True, this tolerant view may easily eliminate the diffi-
culties of reversal or retrial, but in the process it sanctions jury lawlessness.
This judicial shuffle around the larger problem merely compounds the
confusion which will exist until the conflict is eliminated.
Another argument brought forth where plaintiffs attack compromise
verdicts assumes that the plaintiff has received a sympathy verdict-
damages to which he was not entitled; 2 2 but, continues the argument, it is
unfair to subject the defendant to the inconvenience of a new trial.23 What
is being said is nothing more than that the verdict should be allowed to
stand as a compromise. Again, as with the former explanation, it is more
descriptive than analytical.
A final argument-again reflecting a certain resignation in the face
of reality-is that juries generally compromise in all types of cases, usually
without detection; therefore, where compromise is evident it should simi-
larly be permitted. 24 This is hardly persuasive: it is seldom thought un-
just to discriminate against known lawlessness even though similar
activity goes undetected. Still further, this defense reduces the law to so
much doctrinal clay in the jury's grasp, inasmuch as it is premised upon
the fact that juries do, silently, disobey their instructions. Finally, as is
true with all these theories, it puts the court in the position of affirming
known jury disobedience; at least this cannot be said when disobedience
goes undetected.
Since compromise verdicts are theoretically at war with the black
letter rules stating the effect of contributory negligence on plaintiffs' cases,
it is not surprising that the more sophisticated judicial attempts at expla-
nation do not admit the element of compromise; rather they seek to
rationalize the result within the conventional role of juries and the law.
Elec. Light Co., 221 Pa. 611, 70 AtI. 874 (1908) ; Oil City Fuel Supply Co. v. Boundy,
122 Pa. 449, 15 AtI. 865 (1888) ; Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9, 2 Atl. 87
(1885). But see Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 38 A.2d 44 (1944).
This seems to be the earliest case supporting a compromise verdict, although it does
not do so overtly.
22 This was mentioned as a basis in Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d
150 (1955).
23 "[B]ecause of such doubts [of contributory negligence] the verdicts may have
been the result of a compromise, and, in such cases, the evidence not being clearly
preponderant, and the verdicts rendered being at least substantial, it would be 'just
as likely, or more likely, that the granting of a new trial would constitute an act of
injustice to the defendant rather than one of justice to the plaintiff' . . . ." Patter-
son v. Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 268, 61 A.2d 861, 866 (1948), quoting in part
from Carpenelli v. Scranton Bus Co., 350 Pa. 184, 188, 38 A.2d 44, 46 (1944).
24 "It is unrealistic to assume that the judge's charge, filled with technical rules
for the jury to follow in arriving at its verdict, is never dimmed in the jury room by
the guiding light of a layman's sense of right . . . Jurors are more likely to view
the evidence as a whole and apply their accumulated experience and combined sense
of justice to arrive at a result they think fair to all the parties under all the circum-
stances. This is not a fault but a virtue of the jury system; it is one of the system's
blessings, not one of its evils. This humanizes and tempers the cold logic which
accepts no compromises and recognizes no grays." Friedman v. Matovich, 191 Pa.
Super. 275, 279-80, 156 A.2d 608, 611 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
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One such argument relies on the jury's undoubted right, as trier of fact,
to believe or disbelieve the evidence. If the verdict does not in fact equal
plaintiff's special damages, the reason must be that the jury did not accept
his evidence on damages, despite finding liability. Therefore, it is entirely
proper that he be limited to an award commensurate with his "actual"
losses, as found by the panel.25 This solution is undoubtedly a theoretical
possibility, but instances in which it may be practically applied are not
numerous. In many cases the defendant, although contesting liability,
does not offer conflicting evidence on damages. In such a case, the jury's
disbelief of uncontradicted evidence would seem to warrant a new trial
under the substantiality test,26 for if the jury awards an amount under
the special damages, without conflicting evidence, the necessary basis for
a rational determination of the figure is absent. 27 This argument may well
be valid in certain restricted fact situations, but its general application to
sustain verdicts that are obviously compromises is unwarranted; widely
applied, it would be no more than a silent evasion of the reviewing court's
duty to confine jury action to its proper hemisphere.
In still another argument attempting to delineate a rationale for com-
promise verdicts within the traditional concepts, Dean Prosser has added
a third branch 28 to the common-law dichotomy.2 9 As yet seldom used by
the courts in compromise cases,30 his "doctrine of avoidable consequences"
suggests that a plaintiff may be negligent in such a way as not to con-
tribute to his accident but rather to aggravate the extent of his injury.
For example, the driver of an automobile which hits an unguarded chuck-
hole at sixty miles per hour is seriously injured. But had he been
traveling at a legal rate of thirty-five miles per hour, the accident, while
unavoidable, would have produced only minor injuries. The jury, argues
Dean Prosser, would be justified in reducing plaintiff's recovery by the
amount attributable to his own fault. It must be stated that Dean Prosser
himself does not see the difference from contributory negligence as being
really much more than that the jury can apportion damages.3' Under-
lying the doctrine is an attempt to use the causation principle to allocate
damages; its relevance goes much more to an argument in favor of com-
parative negligence over the present system. In the traditional setting,
with contributory negligence as a bar, it stands no better than the contention
of the person concurrently negligent who claims that but for another's
25 See, e.g., Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955); Takac v.
Bamford, 370 Pa. 389, 88 A.2d 86 (1952).
26 See, e.g., Karcesky v. Laria, supra note 25, at 238, 114 A.2d at 156 (dissent);
Takac v. Bamford, supra note 25, at 395, 88 A.2d at 89 (dissent).
27 Cf. Krusinski v. Chioda, 394 Pa. 90, 145 A.2d 681 (1958).
28 See note 14 supra and accompanying text
29 PROSSER, TORTS § 52, at 397-400 (1941).
30 See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); O'Keefe v.
Kansas City W. Ry., 87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416 (1912). Prosser also suggests that
Gould v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297 (1878), might be read as following the rule.
3 1 PRossER, TORTS § 52, at 400 (1941).
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negligence there would have been no accident; his fault was not the entire
cause of the accident, and so he should be relieved from liability. Needless
to say, this attempt to divorce one's self partially or totally from respon-
sibility is unavailing; 3 2 likewise, ingenious structures based on casuality
are of little help in resolving the compromise verdict problem. If sub-
sequent to the accident the plaintiff negligently increases his injuries,
existing law recognizes this distinction and refuses to give damages for
the aggravation, 3 but Dean Prosser's assertion is not restricted to this
fact situation. He is arguing that the defendant may escape payment of
damages for injuries flowing from the accident insofar as the plaintiff
caused them. Current law, however, provides that if the plaintiff has
contributed in any way he is precluded from all recovery. When causation
is used to solve the dilemma of compromise verdicts, it must be recognized
that this involves changing the present law.
CHANGING THE LAW SUB SILENTIO
Inasmuch as it is impossible to reconcile compromise verdicts with
the espoused law of negligence, it is apparent that a judicial imprimatur
has been placed upon a sub silentio change of the law-a change effected
by jury action.3 4 Rather than altering the rule openly by a direct pro-
nouncement rejecting the former standard in favor of a different one, the
common-law bar is charged to the jury while sanction is given to a device
which undermines and eventually modifies the law.3 5 This method of change
poses problems relating to the proper functioning of the judicial process.
Jury lawmaking decreases the possibility that the merits and dis-
advantages of the change will receive full consideration and lessens the
chance that the optimum degree and direction of revision will be attained.
Each instance raising the question of alteration presents a unique problem.
It contains complex balances and considerations, many of which the jury
cannot be expected to evaluate competently. Needless to say, if the law
is changed silently, many judgments are unexpressed-even unthought.
The fact that the relative merits of the classical tort rule and comparative
negligence have been aired by commentators 3
6 does not relieve the court
32 RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 439 (1934).
33 See, e.g., Potts v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 127 AUt. 605 (1925).
34 Unlike the classical example of nullification of the penal law in England-the
jury often refused to find guilt for a minor crime when the penalty was dispropor-
tionately severe-in this instance the change is often within the awareness, control,
and sanction of the court.
36 Necessarily, courts cannot, like legislatures, be silent on issues presented to
them. For this reason there may be some pronouncement by the court and some
sanction given. However, this does not obviate the fact that the most basic principles
may be changed quietly, thus attracting a minimum amount of attention to the shift.
For one argument as to why maximum attention should be devoted to such a change,
see text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
36 E.g., HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 22.3 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 297-99 (1955);
Mole & Wilson, smpra note 13; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv.
465, 503 (1953). This is not to imply commentators can or should do the reasoning
for the courts. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
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of the responsibility for expressing its reasoning.37 The common-law
process, as described by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, demands that "the
rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the
law." 38 Obviously this change and growth must be reasoned if the law
is to move forward cohesively and coherently. Only by carefully scruti-
nizing social policy and by sifting all available ideas on a question can a
court make informed advances and preserve for its successors the wisdom
of its reasoning. Most important, the courts' interaction with the bar
requires out-in-the-open judicial thinking to enable the latter actively to
contribute to the process of legal development; without articulated premises
the profession can only stand by and at best act as commentator rather
than participant. Change of the law sub silento does not recommend
itself as a tool for forging the best possible rules of substantive law.
The methodology of unarticulated change by jury action causes other
problems. The panel is carefully and fully instructed on the traditional law
of torts, with contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. With-
out any justification in the current law it returns a verdict contrary to the
court's instructions, and instead of censure the jurors receive the approba-
tion of the court. It is one thing to speak of the jury as humanizing and
tempering the law 39 and a vastly different one to allow and approve of
disobedience of instructions. With this background in torts, how does a
reviewing court in criminal cases say that the instructions given to a jury
are any more sacred or the rules of law any more inviolate? 40 If prejudice
is the operative feature, how does the court limit it? Different rights
may be at stake, but jury lawlessness is the same. The price of change
by this method seems very high, and equally dangerous.
In the face of these drawbacks, the argument for using juries to
revise the substantive law must be based on the premise that they can do
that which the courts are unable or unwilling to do, and do it despite their
common-law function as triers of fact rather than makers of law. Dean
Griswold has well stated the traditional reaches of jury power:
Juries have an important function, but it is a limited function. It is
not a function of caprice or whim, or of expressing vindictive or
generous impulses. It is a function of deciding questions of fact on
evidence to support a verdict. Whether the evidence is adequate to
37 It might be argued, for example, that this method of changing the law would
be more applicable to the law of divorce than that of contracts, since in the former
here are such vital "political" factors preventing change that this is the only method
by which the law may move forward. See Traynor, Fact Skepticismn and the Judicial
Process, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 638 (1958).
38 LLEwELLYN, THE BRAmiLE BusH 157 (1951); cf. Morris, Law and Fact, 55
HIAv. L. Rxv. 1303, 1321 (1942).
39 See Friedman v. Matovich, 191 Pa. Super. 275, 156 A.2d 608 (1959). See
also note 23 stupra.
40 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861 (1960) (second
degree murder affirmed; if defendant guilty at all, crime must have been in the first
degree); cf. Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 61 A.2d 309 (1948) ; Common-
wealth v. Ferko, 269 Pa. 39, 112 Atl. 38 (1920).
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support a verdict is a question of law which a court cannot properly
avoid by merely referring all the evidence to a jury. Nor can a court
properly decline to resolve any other question of law by remitting the
entire matter to the trier of the facts.
41
To this narrow duty the jury brings a representative reflection of public
opinion and popular sentiment. While it is unavoidable that community
feeling will color close questions of fact, it is not the office of the jury to
interject it into the law. Yet it is undoubtedly this attribute that appeals
to those who advocate the jury as a legitimate medium of change.
"Traditionally juries are the device by which the rigor of the law is
modified pending the enactment of new statutes." 42  Judges "are mindful
that the community no longer accepts as completely valid legal principles
basing liability upon fault." 43 What is advocated is the popularization of
the law pending either legislative or judicial pronouncement. Often this
willingness to leave the law to the jury stems from the belief that certain
substantive changes considered desirable by the advocate, will result.
44
But this zeal for the end disregards the means. When this tempering of-
or tampering with-the law is done by a jury apparently within its function
as a trier of fact and therefore is not readily discernible by a court review-
ing the verdict, there is some merit in the contention in terms of expediency;
but when the jury's action is within sight of the court, expediency cannot
justify judicial abdication. 45 The quick solution to one problem levies a
high toll on the system. This same argument is perhaps more effective in
cases where the verdict appears on its face manifestly within the jury's
function, and a court refuses to look behind the fact-finding process to see
if the jury has actually performed in accordance with its instructions. For
example, in the current law of divorce, if the fact-finding process were
drastically tightened, the substantive law would become oppressive.46 In
this vein, Justice Traynor noted that "more would be lost than gained by a
41 Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge
Arnold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 86-87 (1960).
42WyzanskM, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1286 (1952).
43 Id. at 1285.
44 It is submitted that this is exactly the position of James when he says: "A
reasoned determination that a broad delegation is needed today on the issue of accident
liability may well reflect judicial statesmanship rather than an evasion of judicial
responsibility." James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process,
8 BUFFALo L. RFv. 315, 343 (1959). On the other hand, he would not leave the same
discretion to the jury on issues of amount of damages. Id. at 344. It seems evident
that James' hope is for more universal compensation. One wonders if his position
on "judicial statesmanship" would change if it were to be shown that freedom of the
jury was resulting in fewer recoveries.
45 But see James, supra note 44, at 343: "It is not, I submit, an improper abdica-
tion of responsibility to the jury to call on its dispensing power-its equitable function
when the occasion is appropriate."
46 For example, the requisite finding of domicile is often found on questionable
evidence. Similarly, collusion which would invalidate the grounds for divorce is
not closely investigated. In either of these two areas more extensive methods of fact
finding would make the obtaining of a divorce considerably more difficult in many
states.
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reform of fact-finding that would only compel righteous adherence to the
wrong rules." 47 The court in such a situation is not openly sanctioning
lawlessness, but it is engaging in a fiction. Although this may be better
than rigid adherence to a poor substantive rule, it can hardly be advocated
as the ideal method of change and it may remove the stimulus for better
devised action.
48
Allowing the jury openly to modify the law has practical ramifications.
When the court has permitted the jury this freedom, no firm rule pro-
nounces the freedom's limits. Assuming there has been a decision to
compromise, not only has the substantive rule been altered but the jury
has also set itself loose in the damage area with no legal guides whatsoever.
Inevitably this situation leads to confusion and a waste of time and money.
The trial court is trapped in a maze of contrary holdings which are not
helpful in instructing the jury or in ruling on a motion for new trial. 49 A
former rule of law has become meaningless, but how far-reaching is the
shift? 50 Has the change affected the standards of nonsuits, judgments
notwithstanding the verdict, or new trials because of inadequacy? Diffi-
culty at the trial level is unavoidable, and many of the problems will reach
the appellate courts. There is no theoretical line on which to distinguish
the test for substantiality and the common-law bar rule from permitted jury
compromise-the standard for review seems impossible to verbalize. It
would be extremely wasteful of the court's time to compel it to weigh each
piece of evidence, but no other solution presents itself. The limits of the
"time-honored right" can be ascertained-assuming that the appellate courts
do not favor complete abdication-only by first looking at the evidence
and then at the jury's verdict in the light of that evidence. If the courts
are to maintain the new position regarding the effect of jury compromise,
they are virtually forced to function as a superjury in deciding what amount
of contributory negligence, if any, will bar a plaintiff. Finally, since juries
have this "right" to compromise, it would seem that even if an incorrect
monetary award were discovered, a complete new trial would be required
-unless this particular plaintiff's conduct has transgressed a judicially
demarcated point beyond which the jury can no longer compromise. Before
reaching this line, the court could not say that contributory negligence
defeats the plaintiff, nor, on the other hand, could the court allow the
plaintiff his undisputed damages as of right. Such a process would clearly
be time-consuming; and in this day of crowded dockets, anything produc-
tive of increased trial time cannot be regarded neutrally.
47 Traynor, supra note 37, at 638.
48 Since the hardship of the rule is presumably mitigated, legislative action be-
comes less likely, and the court itself is no longer pressured as rigorously by the bar
for change. Divorce law is again an example of this phenomenon.
49 See Davis v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 108 PIrrSB3URGH LEGAL J. 351 (Pa.
C.P. 1960) ; cf. Salemmo v. Dolan, 192 Pa. Super. 51, 159 A.2d 253 (1960) (fairness
of compromise). See also Murosky v. Spaulding, 166 A.2d 34 (Pa. 1961).
50 See text accompanying note 17 supra. See also Pascarella v. Pittsburgh Ry.,
389 Pa. 8, 131 A.2d 445 (1957). In this case the compromise rule was not applied,
and a new trial granted. The opinion, by Mr. Justice Musmanno, had no dissenting
votes.
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JURY COMPROMISE
FUTURE RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT PROBLEM
Compromise verdicts in Pennsylvania negligence actions-common-
place and yet irreconcilable with the common-law rule supposedly still in
effect-might well be expressly authorized or rejected by the legislature.
The broadest solution, and in many respects the most elementary, would
be a legislative pronouncement adopting the rule of comparative negli-
gence.51 If the underlying reason for the breadth of jury power to render
compromise verdicts is dissatisfaction with the present substantive rule,
this resolution commends itself. In terms of prospective notice, scope of
pronouncement, and the relative certainty of the rules to be applied in
various cases, the common-law process cannot compete with statutory
revision. But in the absence of legislative action, the courts could attempt
the change.52 Necessarily, however, a judicially effected change would
be accomplished less rapidly and less precisely than a legislative revision.
Other more easily implemented solutions than the adoption of com-
parative negligence are available to the courts, provided that they find the
common-law rule satisfactory. First and most apparent would be the dis-
allowance of compromise verdicts. Upon the elimination of the "time-
honored right" doctrine, the remaining problem is one of enforcement of
the common-law rule upon juries prone to compromise. Providing for
separate trials on the issues of liability and of damages approaches the
problem directly and also conforms to the theoretical division between the
two issues. But a division is time-consuming and financially burden-
some. Moreover, separation may result in a tightening of the fact-finding
process far beyond the requirements of the problem.53 Much of tort
damage law-especially in the area of pain and suffering-remains hazy,
and rigid policing would tend to bring about unconsidered changes in areas
perhaps not ready to be clearly defined.
Other less drastic means are available for policing verdicts for com-
promise. On finding a compromise verdict, an appellate court could
probably do no more than to reverse and remand. However, the use of
special verdicts could decrease the frequency of cases in which this would
be necessary. In addition to sharpening the jury's thinking, special verdicts
properly employed can make compromise verdicts readily detectable and
correctable at the trial level, thereby effecting control of verdicts where
that control is most effective and relieving the appellate courts of an un-
necessary-though self-created-burden.
A.S.L.
51 See Federal Employers' Liability Acts (Railroads), 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908),
45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53 (1958) ; Jones Act (Injuries to Seamen), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
52 See Mole & Wilson, supra note 13, where the availability of the various methods
of change to comparative negligence is considered. Cf. Traynor, Law and Social
Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230.
53 See Traynor, supra note 37. This is his fear when the juries are over-policed
without an examination of the entire substantive law in the area.
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